Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/18: CIA-RDP80M00165A002100010044-3

THE WHITE HOUSE

79-11092

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

27 December 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT:

Summary of Conclusions of SCC(I) Meeting, 21 December 1977

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions of the SCC(I) meeting on 21 December 1977 on the Horn of Africa.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

SECRET/SENSITIVE

WALDINGHO DEDIVATION DIE

NSC

CLASSIFIED BYZbigniew Brzezinsk

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLIANSICATION

SCHEDULE OF EUROPHIE OF THE SECTION

EMPHORICATEDORY OF THE CANADA OF TH

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

## SECRET/SENSITIVE

21 December 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, SCC(I) Meeting, 21 December 1977,

3: 30-4: 45 p.m., White House Situation Room

PARTICIPANTS:

State:

Cyrus Vance

Warren D. Christopher

Richard Moose

Defense:

Harold Brown

David E. McGiffert

General George Brown (JCS)

Lt. Gen. W.Y. Smith (JCS)

CIA:

William W. Wells

Robert Bowie

William Parmenter

Justice:

Frederick D. Baron

Kenneth Bass

NSC:

Zbigniew Brzezinski (Chairman)

David Aaron

Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)

The meeting was devoted entirely to discussion of the current situation in the Horn of Africa and its implications for U.S. policy. During the first 25 minutes CIA representatives summarized currently available intelligence on the Soviet Airlift, the military situation in Ethiopia, Ethiopian and Somali military capabilities and the Ethiopian political situation. At the end of this presentation, Dr. Brzezinski directed the intelligence community to give high priority to collection of information on all these subjects and to analysis deriving from it—in particular Somali capabilities and foreign support.

The next 40 minutes were devoted to discussion of the implications of Horn developments for U.S. policy, their potential impact on larger issues in U.S.-Soviet relations, and possible courses of action the United States could consider to keep the situation from deteriorating further and cause developments to move in directions more favorable to our basic interests. In anticipation of a more focused meeting on these subjects in January with, hopefully, more information available, Dr. Brzezinski suggested that several subjects be further studied, with discussions meanwhile at Working Group level if necessary:

SECRET/SENSITIVE

T FICH GIVENAL DECLASSIFICATION
DUE DA ELITOLANA DIDER 11552 EXGIR GATEDIARY LE SUITE (C) (C) (or (4) )

## SECRET/SENSITIVE

- the stability of the Mengistu government and the character of alternate leadership groups.
- the current and projected military balance between the Ethiopians and the Somalis.
- the role of PDRY and ways of influencing it.
- possibilities for promoting serious negotiations between the Ethiopians and the Somalis.
- new diplomatic initiatives in Africa and Europe.
- means of denying the Soviets an opportunity to consolidate their position in Ethiopia.

| possibilities for direct, frank talks with the Soviets. | 25) |
|---|-----|
|   |     |
|   |     |

DEC 78 8 26 PM 17]

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/18: CIA-RDP80M00165A002100010044-3

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Routing Slip TO: **ACTION** INFO DATE INITIAL 7 DCI DDCI D/DCI/IC DDS&T 5 DDI DDA rugio. DDO D/DCI/NI GC 10 LC 11 IG 12 Compt D/Pers D/S 15 DTR A/DCI/PA 17 AO/DCI C/IPS 18  $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{1}{i} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{1}{i} \sum_{i$ 19 DCI/SS 20 21 SUSPENSE Remarks:

STAT

3637 (8-77)

28 Wec